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statement of legislative intent with respect to this question. In the
later case of Crawford v. Parsons, 141 W. Va. 752, 92 S.E.2d 913
(1956), the constitutionality of the new amendment was upheld
against an attack which charged that the law was arbitrary and ca-
pricious legislation, and that it deprived one of his common law
right to sue a negligent torifeasor. In light of the amendment and
the Crawford decision it would seem that an employee in West Vir-
ginia now enjoys the same immunity as his employer when the em-
ployer is covered by the Act.
Even though an employee is not held liable for his ordinary
negligence on the job under the present West Virginia law, it is not
intended that a worker's duty not to injure his co-worker be extin-
guished or in any way lessened. The statute contemplates only or-
dinary negligence, and gross, wanton or malicious actions are still
the proper subjects of an action at law for damages.
In 1 ScHNIEnR, WoRiTaMN's COMPENSATION § 3 (3d ed. 1941),
it is said that the general purpose of Workmen's Compensation
statutes is to remove the burden of industrial accidents from the em-
ployee and place such expense back in the industry as a cost of the
goods produced. A further purpose is to permit the injured em-
ployee to avoid the tangles of litigation and to acquire compensation
as rapidly as possible, as well as immediate medical attention. See
also, Mains v. Harris Co., 119 W.Va. 730, 197 S.E. 10 (1938). The
present West Virginia law would seem to more effectively accomplish
the above stated purpose, since now a worker must look to the
statute for compensation and cannot sue his co-worker for damages.
The rule adopted by the Alaska court makes it possible, in some
cases, to charge the negligent worker with the expense of these ac-
cidents, as was done in the principal case. The present West Vir-
ginia statute presents what appears to be the more practical view
with respect to this question and in theory is contra to the holding of
the principle case.
W. E. M.
TORTS-CONCUEBENT CAusE.-Combined actions were brought
for the wrongful deaths of passengers in an airplane manufactured
by D. The widows of the deceased passengers alleged improper
construction as negligence. The trial court charged the jury that
where an injury may result from one of several causes, for only one
of which D is responsible, the burden rests with P to individuate
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that one as the proximate cause of the injury, and to exclude all
other causes fairly suggested by the evidence to which it would
be equally reasonable to attribute the accident. Held, reversing the
trial court, that in an action for death of passengers in an airplane
manufactured by D, P had the burden of proving that lack of care
on the part of the manufacturer was a cause of the accident, and
recovery did not depend on proof that its conduct was the only
cause. Kendrick v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 265 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1959).
In considering the principal case, it is difficult to justify the
decision of the lower court. The weight of authority in the United
States seems to support the conclusion reached by the court of
appeals. United States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1953); American Creosote Works v. Harp, 215 Miss. 5,
60 So.2d 514 (1952); Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4 N. J. 428, 73 A.2d
183 (1950). Of course a basic precept of tort law is that the pur-
ported negligence claimed by P must be the proximate cause of
the injury suffered by him. However, the proximate cause need
not be the sole cause, but it is sufficient if such negligence, concur-
ring with other efficient causes, proximately caused the injury. In-
land Power & Light Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1937).
The situation in the principal case is more difficult because of
the entrance of concurrent or intervening negligence. These two
terms have been a continual topic of discussion and confusion to
lawyers and writers alike. Unfortunately these words have been
used interchangeably to such an extent that many have lost sight
of their original meaning. The court in Carr v. St. Louis Auto Sup-
ply Co., 293 Mo. 562, 239 S.W. 827 (1922), defines concurrent neg-
ligence as arising when the injury is proximately caused by the con-
current wrongful acts or omissions of two or more persons acting
independently. On the other hand, intervening negligence may be
defined as resulting from "the act of an independent agency which
destroys the casual connection between the negligent act of D and
the wrongful injury." Davenport v. McClellan, 88 N.J.L. 653, 96
AtI. 921 (1916). In such a case, damages are not recoverable from
the original wrongdoer because his act is not the proximate cause
of the injury. In the case in question, D alleged as an intervening
cause the negligent operation of the plane by its pilot. Since the
case was sent back to the lower court because of a faulty instruc-
tion, it is difficult to determine whether the appellate court felt an
intervening cause was present. However, from the previous history
of the case and the language of the court in reaching its conclusion,
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it does seem that either such a cause was present, or there was no
actionable negligence by D.
If D here were in fact negligent, it could not escape the conse-
quences of its conduct because the act of a third person may have
contributed to the injury. "The general rule is that whoever acts
negligently is answerable for all the consequences that may ensue
in the ordinary course of events, even though such consequences
are immediately and directly brought about by an intervening cause,
if such intervening cause was set in motion by the original wrong-
doer." 88 Am. JuR. NEGLIGENCE § 69 (1941). See also The G. R.
Booth, 171 U. S. 450 (1898); Hunt-Forbes Constr. Co. v. Jordanrs
Adm'x., 250 Ky. 455, 63 S.W.2d 501 (1933). However, assuming
that D was negligent, it would not be liable if the intervening act
of a third person was unforseeable by an ordinary prudent D. Then
such act would be said to insulate the original negligent act of D
and free him of liability. The act of the third person, in this case
the pilot, would then be called a superceding act, as it would be
unanticipated by one in D's position. Hall v. Coble Dairies, 234
N. C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951).
There is another view which merits attention in considering
this problem; it is the aspect of the case dealt with by the circuit
court. When there is concurrent negligence, and the injury would
not have occurred in the absence of either negligent act, the wrong-
ful conduct of each is deemed the proximate cause of the injury.
United States v. First Sec. Bank, supra. This is true although the
parties may have acted independently of each other. Hall v. Coble
Dairies, supra. In such a situation both are answerable, jointly or
severally, to the same extent they would be if the total negligence
were theirs alone. Each act is the proximate cause provided it is
the natural and probable cause of the injury. United States v. First
Sec. Bank, supra. For a general discussion of this subject, see 38
Am. Jul. NEGLIGENCE § 64 1941).
While no factual situation identical to the principal case could
be found in West Virginia, the court approaches a case having a
similar set of facts in a somewhat different manner. In Webb v.
Sessler, 135 W. Va. 341, 63 S.E.2d 65 (1950), the decedent was
killed while sitting in his legally parked automobile. It was struck
by a negligently operated airplane attempting to land at an airport,
which was built too close to the highway in violation of a statute.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the
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proximate cause was the last negligent act contributing thereto
which was the cause of the injury. Thus the first negligent act, the
violation of the statute, was insulated by the second, the pilot's
negligence, which became the superceding cause of the injury. This
theory was cited with approval by the court in Hartley v. Crede,
140 W. Va. 183, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954), where it was held that the
negligence of a driver of a motor vehicle which swerved to avoid
hitting an auto parked in the road, thereby striking P, was the only
proximate cause of the injury. From these cases it would appear
that West Virginia is contra to the weight of authority.
However, the West Virginia court has not been consistent in
its holdings in this type of case. In the Webb case, supra, it was held
that with the occurrence of the second negligent act, the first such
act becomes a mere condition upon which the second negligence
acts. On the other hand, Snyder v. Philadelphia Co., 54 W. Va. 149,
46 S.E. 366 (1903), stated that the first act remains the proximate
cause of the injury, the second act being only a condition upon
which the first negligence acts. In this case D was negligent in
blowing off a gas well; P's horse threw him when a defective rein
broke, the latter being the concurring cause of the injury. While
this is the oldest West Virginia case dealing with the problem, it
has not been expressly overruled.
To add to this inconsistency, West Virginia has expounded a
third view in Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W. Va. 613, 77 S.E.2d 164
(1953). There the first negligent party illegally parked his truck;
the second negligent driver hit the vehicle, injuring P who was in
the parked truck. The court held that the acts constitute concurrent
negligence, and both drivers were held liable as joint tort-feasors
since their independent acts united in causing a single injury. This
case was followed in Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d
857 (1954), where the court stated that such a conclusion does not
overrule the decision of the Webb case, supra, but rather is distin-
guishable from it. Thus in West Virginia there are cases which have
followed the weight of authority.
While the West Virginia decisions on this subject are far from
being consistent, their apparent inconsistencies may be explained
by the different factual situations involved. Whatever the reason,
it poses a problem which remains unsettled in West Virginia. Al-
though it is impossible to ascertain with any certainty which of the
cited decisions the court may follow in the future, it would seem
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that the most logical path is the one expounded by the principal
case, i.e. that there may be more than one cause of an injury, and
in such a case, the various wrongdoers may be jointly or severally
held for their negligence.
In conclusion, it would seem that the decision of the principal
case is correct and follows the weight of authority in the United
States. There certainly may be concurrent causes of an injury, and,
depending on various factors, one or both of the negligent parties
may be held liable for their wrongful acts. In cases similar to the
principal case, the West Virginia court has followed three trends of
thought with little consistency, leaving much confusion in this area.
F. L. D., Jr.
TORT-FATHER'S ACToN AGAINST AN UNEMANCIPATED SON FOR
Loss OF SERvICES OF ANOTHER UNEMAN CPATED SON.-B was injured
in an automobile accident while riding in a car driven by his brother,
D. The father of the two unemancipated boys brought this action
against D to recover for loss of services and medical expenses in-
curred by B. In a companion action B, by his father as guardian ad
litem, seeks to recover damages for personal injuries from D and the
driver of the other car involved in the accident. D moved to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds that an action by a father against
his unemancipated son is contrary to public policy. Held, the father
could maintain this derivative action, regardless of whether the
claim was covered by liability insurance. Becker v. Rieck, 188
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1959).
This case presents an unusual situation, one in which the court
was faced with an almost complete lack of precedent upon which to
base its decision. Thus it is necessary to draw conclusions in this fac-
tual situation by analyzing the cases in the field of family immunity
in tort actions, to determine if such immunity should be applied to
cases similar to the one under discussion.
At common law, spouses were not permitted to sue each other
for torts. Since most states have removed these common law disa-
bilities by the passage of married women's property acts, it has
been advocated that this removes all disabilities of married women,
and they should therefore be able to sue and be sued by their
spouses for torts. However, such is not the case, and the majority of
states, including West Vrginia, have interpreted such acts as not per-
mitting suits between spouses for torts. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293
5
D.: Torts--Concurrent Causes
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960
